The Attitude of Trust is Basic

Paul Faulkner
Most philosophical discussion of trust focuses on the three-place trust predicate: X trusting Y to φ. This paper argues that it is the one-place and two-place predicates Ð X is trusting, and X trusting Y Ð that are fundamental.
Almost without exception, philosophical discussion of trust focuses on the three-place trust predicate: X trusts Y to φ (see, for instance, Baier 1986 , Holton 1994 , Jones 1996 , Faulkner 2007 , Hieronymi 2008 and Hawley 2014 . And then understands the two-place trust predicate Ð X trusts Y Ð derivatively. So Hawley analyses X trusts Y to φ as X relies on Y to φ because X believes Y has a commitment to φ (2014: 10). And two-place trust is then Òreliance on someone to fulfil whatever commitments she may haveÓ (2014: 16) . There is no question that three-place trust is central to our engagement with others. We trust one another to act in various ways Ð to turn up on time, return our goods, give a fair quote and so on Ð but, it is the contention of this paper, that this form of trust, its contractual form one might say, is not fundamental. Rather, the fundamental forms of trust are purely attitudinal: they are X trusting, and trusting Y. Whilst our relying on others to do things can permit all sorts of explanations, the fundamental explanation of why X trusts Y to φ is simply that X trusts Y or merely that X is trusting. Two-place and one-place trust Ð our trusting and trusting others Ð are the basic forms of trust.
That the two-place and one-place trust predicate should be taken as basic can, I think, be supported by five independent pieces of evidence.
The first piece of evidence comes from everyday language. First, both the two-place predicate ÔX trusts YÕ and the three-place ÔX trusts Y to φÕ have unique and irreducible meanings. It is true that sometimes we use ÔX trusts YÕ as shorthand for ÔX trusts Y in some particular wayÕ; for instance, asked why she left her diary visible on the desk, X might reply that she trusts Y, and by this mean that she trusts Y not to read it. However, this is not the most straightforward use of ÔX trusts YÕ, which is that of a description of XÕs attitude towards Y as a trusting or trustful one, see Becker (1996: 44-5) . And by implication that Y, the object of XÕs attitude of trust, is someone, as X takes it, who can be trusted. By contrast, ÔX trusts Y to φÕ is a metaphysically hybrid notion insofar as it describes an action Ð XÕs relying on Y to φ Ð and says of that, that it is done with, and because of, a certain attitude, which is best described as trusting. That is, if it reports the fact of XÕs reliance and XÕs attitude to relying, then it is not a direct description of XÕs attitude and so does not carry the implication that X thinks Y is someone to be trusted. Now while ÔX trusts YÕ might imply a disposition to rely on Y in various ways, and one to rely on Y to φ, it cannot be reduced to such a disposition and formalised as Ô∀φ, X trusts Y to φÕ. For ÔX trusts YÕ might be true, while Ô∀φ, X trusts Y to φÕ will almost certainly be false: there is always a limit to what we will trust others to do. Moreover, this does not seem to be merely a quantification issue, since there is no restricted range of φ, R, for which Ô∀φ R, X trusts Y to φÕ stands as an adequate formalism of ÔX trusts YÕ. For while it might be true that a complete lack of willingness to rely on Y would falsify the claim that ÔX trusts YÕ, there is no particular way in which X must rely on Y for this claim to be true. However, while ÔX trusts YÕ and ÔX trusts Y to φÕ are unique statements, there is some implication from the former to the latter but not the other way round. If X does trust Y, then there must be some φ for which X trusts Y to φ. But that X trusts Y to φ does not, in any way, imply that X trusts Y more generally, even if this would often also be true. Thus, of the two predicates, the two-place one is arguably more fundamental.
Similar things may then be said when comparing the one-place predicate ÔX trustsÕ Ð or maybe the grammatically better ÔX is trustingÕ Ð with the two-place predicate ÔX trusts YÕ. The former equally seems to have a place in everyday language: Òwe doÓ, Uslaner observes, Òspeak of Ôtrusting peopleÕ generallyÓ (2002: 22) . And this form does not seem reducible to Ô∀Y, X trusts YÕ for similar reasons. It will not be that X trusts everyone, and there is no determinate range of people that XÕs trust must range over. Rather, ÔX is trustingÕ seems to make a different claim: that X has faith in people, in some Ògeneralised otherÓ, as Uslaner says, not faith in any specific person or description (2002: 24) . But again, while ÔX is trustingÕ and ÔX trusts YÕ seem to be different and unique statements, there is some implication from the former to the latter but not the other way round. So of the two predicates, the oneplace predicate is arguably more fundamental. Thus, the heart of our notion of trust seems to be simply an attitude of trust, which may, but need not, take specific persons as its object, and which can support, but need not, the act of relying on persons. This is what is meant by the claim that the attitude of trust is basic.
The second and third bits of evidence come from considering trust in conjunction with distrust. ÒTo understand trustÓ, Katherine Hawley says, Òwe must also understand distrust, yet distrust is usually treated as a mere afterthought, or mistakenly equated with an absence of trustÓ (2014: 1). The mere absence of trust might report nothing about oneÕs attitudes but rather stem from the fact that there is no cause for reliance. The car mechanic I trust when I donÕt seek a second quote, I donÕt trust to deliver my mail. However, my lack of trust here is its mere absence: I donÕt trust the mechanic in this regard not because I donÕt think him up to the job but because that is not his job. So I donÕt rely on him in this respect. Distrust, however, is not the mere absence of trust: it is an attitude in its own right, and one might expect as Hawley proposes, there to be analytic connections between the attitudes of trust and distrust; such as, for instance, that if distrust is an appropriate attitude to take, then trust is not (2014: 4). However, that there are such analytic connections is hard to maintain if the fundamental notion of trust is taken to be three-place or ÔX trusting Y to φÕ. Given that trust in this sense is metaphysically hybrid, any failure of trust can always be down to the failure of the action component. (My not trusting my mechanic to deliver my mail because I donÕt rely on him to do this.) But then trust could be inappropriate because of some inappropriateness in this action component; it would, for instance, be wrong to trust my mechanic to deliver my mail. However, this wrongness does not imply it is right to distrust my mechanic. So to keep the parallel between trust and distrust, the focus needs to be on the attitudinal conception of trust: trusting Y and distrusting Y. Moreover, this is implied by the fact that there is no three-place distrust predicate: even when distrust is appropriate, we do not say ÔX distrusts Y to φÕ.
Third, trust and distrust, it is often said, are contraries but not contradictories (Jones 1996: 15) . And this is true all the while trust is conceived contractually, or as three-place. In this case, a lack of trust need not imply distrust because there might be a lack of trust because there is a lack of reliance; there is no contract, as it were, or commitment as Hawley would say (2014: 10). I donÕt trust my mechanic to deliver my mail because I donÕt rely on him doing so, he have having undertaken no commitment to do so. So all the while trust is conceived contractually, a lack of trust does not imply distrust Ð trust and distrust are merely contraries. However, a lack of trust can imply distrust. Where trust is the background attitude Ð where it is two-place or oneplace Ð if trust is lost what remains is not merely its lack but distrust. Suppose X trusts Y. In saying that X trusts Y, were X to say this, what X describes is a basic attitude that one can take towards a person, which involves making positive presumptions about their goodwill towards oneself. Remove these positive presumptions, so that it can no longer be taken for granted that Y will act in certain ways and will not act in others and what is left is distrust. For example, you might not seek a second quote simply because you trust your mechanic, and if so, you just presume the quote is honest; you might leave your diary lying on the desk simply because you trust your parents, and if so, so you just presume they wonÕt read it; or suppose you trust your partner, if so you will just presume they are not cheating on you; and so on. Remove trust in these cases, so you no longer presume the quote honest, the diary safe or your partner faithful and these situations are now ones of distrust.
Relatedly, we tend not to trust people not to do things. We can do so, I can trust you not to reveal my secrets for instance, but generally we do not so. For instance, you donÕt trust your partner not to have an affair, not because they canÕt be trusted in this but because such trust is peculiarly self-defeating. To trust them not to have an affair would be to draw their attention to the fact that you do not presume they will not, and so to draw their attention to the fact that you distrust them. Equally, your partner would not reassure you were they to say ÔdonÕt worry I wonÕt be unfaithfulÕ. This should be unspoken, part of what is presumed by mutual trust. The same goes for one-place trust, in having a non-directed attitude of trust we presume things about how people in general will behave towards us. For instance, we presume they wonÕt be Òunpromptedly aggressiveÓ, where this presumption, Williams observes, can be sustained by reasoning, Òin desperate circumstancesÓ, but in Òbetter timesÓ we just take it for granted. And it needs to be taken for granted because Ò[o]ne is not likely to be reassured by someone who says, ÔI promise not to murder youÕÓ (2002: 89) . Thus to give a proper account of the relation of trust to distrust Ð one which recognises that these can be contradictory Ð requires a purely attitudinal conception of trust. But once trust is conceived attitudinally, it is then hard to see how it is not this attitude that is, as Williams says, the basic form of trust Òon which all social interaction dependsÓ (2002: 88).
The fourth piece of evidence concerns the relationship between trust and trustworthiness. Its relation to the thought that the trusted is trustworthy, in part, identifies the attitude of trust. Reassurance comes from this thought. However, this connection between trust and trustworthiness is broken if trust is conceived contractually, or as three-place. Under this conception, say in a case where X trusts Y to φ, the thought that Y is trustworthy is, at least, that Y will reliably φ. However, it might be that this is not the trustworthy thing to do and, indeed, can be quite the opposite. This might be illustrated by a case where the trusting party is in error. Suppose, then, that X is set on a course of action from which no good will result, but for which he needs to borrow YÕs car. He asks Y for his car keys and Y, fairly judging the consequences of handing them over, refuses. In misjudging what to do, X will equally regard this refusal as Y being blind to his need, and so as a failure of trustworthiness. And if trustworthiness is identified by reference to trust Y would be so. But of course, YÕs response is the right and so trustworthy one. This point is made and developed by Knud Ejler L¿gstrup in his discussion of trust.
The other personÕs interpretation of the implication of the trust offered [that is, the trusting party YÕs interpretation] É is one thing, and the demand which is implicit in that trust É which I must interpret is quite another thing (1997: 21).
Responding to trust cannot be Òmerely a matter of fulfilling the other personÕs expectations and granting his or her wishesÓ (1997: 21) . This is because in the trust situation Òwhat we are speaking of is a demand for love, not for indulgenceÓ (1997: 21) . Thus the demand on the trusted Ð what L¿gstrup calls the radical ethical demand and might be called the demand that X be trustworthy Ð is generated by the fact of the trusting partyÕs dependence. It is not generated by XÕs attitudes Ð that is, by his trust. But this is to say that trustworthiness cannot be defined with respect to trust if trust is conceived contractually, or as three-place. The analytical connection between trust and trustworthiness is preserved if trust is taken to be merely an attitude. For suppose, in this error case, that X simply trusts Y. In trusting Y, X will think that Y is trustworthy. And in thinking this, X will not place any specific expectation on Y, but will rather just expect it of Y that Y does the right or appropriate Ð the trustworthy Ð thing.
Connected to this point is Katherine HawleyÕs observation that trust can be unwanted. In this regard she gives the example of trusting her colleagues to buy her champagne, in a situation where, for whatever reason, she is to be honoured. Now it might be that her colleagues plan to buy her champagne but, Hawley observes, Ò[s]till, they do not invite or welcome my trust in this respect; instead, they want to give me a treat, not merely to act as trustworthiness requires, and certainly not to risk betraying me if they forget to buy the champagneÓ (2014: 7). This observation is good but her trust is unwanted, in part I suggest, because it implies the falsehood that the colleagues would be untrustworthy if they did not supply it. This is false precisely because trustworthiness should not be defined by reference what a trusting party trusts one to do. That is, it is not defined by reference to the three-place trust predicate. Rather, trustworthiness is a matter of doing the appropriate thing whatever that might be, where this might still be to buy champagne in HawleyÕs example. But to trust them to do this Ð the right thing Ð is just to trust in the two-place sense, and such trust would not be unwanted. What is objectionable is the implicit contract, not the background attitude.
The fifth and final piece of evidence for the priority of the one and twoplace predicates over three-place one comes from a consideration of infant trust. Any account of trust, Annette Baier proposes, should accommodate infant trust. And this generates the constraint Òthat it not make essential to trusting the use of concepts or abilities which a child cannot be reasonably believed to possessÓ (1986: 244) . Suppose now that X trusts Y to φ. In trusting Y to φ, X will take an optimistic view of Y and her motivations; and in so taking this view X will, at the very least, presume that Y will φ, or maybe believe that Y will φ, and X will make this presumption because X manifestly depends on Y φ-ing, or holds this belief because Y has committed to φ-ing. However, one understands trust in its contractual form, XÕs trusting Y to φ involves a complex of reasoning. It involves imagining the trust situation from YÕs perspective, imagining YÕs recognition of XÕs dependence; then maybe imagining Y seeing this as a reason to do what X depends on Y doing, or maybe recognising what Y has committed to do in this particular trust situation. Now it is arguable that this kind of second personal reasoning is both prosaic and fundamental to moral thought, see Darwall (2006) . However, it is not the kind of reasoning that an infant could engage in. By contrast, suppose that X trusts or trusts Y; for instance, an infant X trusts his mother Y. In trusting his mother, X need not have any further thought; the trust is no more than a confidence or faith Ð a trust, as we say Ð in his mother. This does seem to be the kind of attitude that an infant could have. Suppose then that BaierÕs constraint on accounts of trust is plausible. This constraint can then be satisfied simply by taking the attitudinal form of trust Ð the one and twoplace predicates Ð to be basic. 
